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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In accord with the principal case holding that it is reversible error to permit
jurors to taste liquor introduced in evidence are: State v. Lindgrove, (1895) 1
Kan. App., 51, 41 P. 688; Skinner v. State, (1925) 101 Tex. Cr. R., 68, 274 S. W.,
133; Peru v. United States, Bird v. United States, (C. C. A., 8th Circuit, 1925)
4 F., (2d) 881. The case going to the greatest length in this direction is Com-
monwealth v. Brelsford, 161 Mass., 61, 36 N. E., 677, where it was held proper
to reject an offer on the part of the defendant to have jurors taste the liquor.
There are fewer cases holding that permitting jurors to smell the liquor is im-
proper. Among these is Jianole v. United States, (C. C. A., 8th Circuit, 1924)
299 F., 496, where it was held an abuse of discretion for the court to direct an
attendant to pour a liquid into a glass "and let the jury smell of it" though no
proper objection was made at the time. These courts apparently rest their de-
cisions upon the grounds: (1) that all evidence must be introduced openly in
court; (2) that the jury must be satisfied from evidence apart from their indi-
vidual knowledge and belief; (3) that when jurors acquire knowledge peculiar
to themselves they cease to be jurors and should be sworn as witnesses; (4)
and that the court should ascertain whether all jurors are equally expert in
taste and smell. In Gallaghan v. United States, Colwell v. United States, (C. C.
A. 8th Circuit, 1924) 299 F., 172, it is said that "the practice is not in keeping
with an orderly and dignified administration of justice." That the practice,
where permitted, should be in open court, in the presence of the defendant and
at all times subject to the control of the court see, Reed v. Territory, (1908) 1
Okl. Cr. 481, 98 P. 583, 129 A. S. R., 861 ; State v. Dascenso, (1924) 30 N. M., 34,
226 P. 1099...Contra, State v. Elmers, (1924) 198 Iowa, 1041, 200 N. W., 723;
State v. Barker, (1912) 67 Wash., 595, 122 P. 335; also State v. Foell, (1923)
37 Idaho, 722, 217 P. 608 (statute permitting taking of exhibits to jury room),
holding that an examination of the liquor in the jury room was not improper.
T. S. '27.
EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FORD CA-This case arose in an action for
damages by Mrs. Stone, plaintiff below, in which she seeks to recover for a
failure, through negligence of the company, to deliver a telegram. The tele-
gram informed her that her brother had but a few hours to live. It was not
delivered until too late for her to attend the funeral, her brother having died
shortly after the telegram was sent to her. In the trial court Mrs. Stone was
permitted to introduce evidence to the effect that she would have departed for
her brother's home immediately upon receipt of the telegram and would have
traveled in a Ford car, continuously, making the 300 miles distance in 20 hours.
The appellant Telegraph Company assigns the admission of this evidence as
error and contend that travel in this manner is not such an established and usual
mode as must have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was entered into. Considering this objection the court says, "We can not as-
sent to the view that travel by a Ford automobile was not, in 1923, an established
and usual mode of travel in this state. Appellee's counsel in their brief have
ably defended the Ford car against the reflection upon it implied by the assertion
that it is not an established and usual mode of travel in this state. These as-
signments need not be discussed at length. A few observations will dispose of
same and vindicate the Ford. It is a matter of common and general knowledge
of which we may take judicial notice that in 1923, and for some years prior
thereto, Mr. Ford's car was recognized in Texas as an established, usual, and
favorite method of transportation; that, barring accidents and undue heating
the motor, it is fully capable of making 300 miles in 20 hours, even if much of the
road be unpaved and must be traveled at night. The mastery which this car
possesses over bad roads and ability to reach its destination under adverse con-
ditions are also matters of common knowledge." Western Union Telegraph
Company v. Stone (Tex. 1926) 283 S. W., 259.
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The court then gave judgment for the plaintiff. The case does not seem to be
out of line with the modem trend and extension of the matters over which the
court will take judicial notice. It is here noted because of its interesting and
unusual application. F. M. H. '27.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-JUDGMENTS-CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE JUDGMENT OF A
FRENCH COURT IN A SUIT IN A NEW YORK STATE CouRT.-Plaintiff was assignee
of triplicate bills of lading issued in New York, under which one Webb shipped
certain goods from New York to Havre. He sued defendant company in a
New York court for delivering the goods to other parties who obtained them
by using an office copy of the bill of lading. Defendant set up judgment ren-
dered by the Tribunal of Commerce at Paris upon the same cause of action, by
the same plaintiff. Although no attempt was made to impeach the judgment
because of fraud, the lower courts in Newv York refused to give effect to the
French judgment. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held, The
judgment of the French court upon the merits is conclusive in a New York
court. "It can be impeached only by proof that the court in which it was rendered
had not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action or of the person of the
defendant, or that it was procured by means of fraud." Reversed. Johnson v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1926), 242 N. Y., 381, 152 N. E., 121.
The lower courts had refused to give effect to the judgment of the French
court on the ground that by the law of France no foreign judgment can be
rendered executory in France without a review of the judgment an fond, that is,
of the whole merits of the cause of action on which the judgment rests. They
had inquired into the merits of the French judgment and decided that it was
contrary to the principles of our law and should be disregarded. In so doing,
they had followed the case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S., 113, 16 S. Ct., 139, 40
L. Ed., 95, which held that a judgment of this same French court was not re-
quired to be recognized as conclusive in this country because the French courts
do not give full faith and credit to the judgments of this country against French
citizens. However, the New York Court of Appeals did not feel bound to
follow Hilton v. Guyot, and reversed the decision of the lower courts. The
rule of Hilton v. Guyot is still the rule in the federal courts, and is followed in
some states. 34 C. J., 1165; 15 R. C. L., 920. The English rule is in accordance
with the New York rule as followed in the principal case, and is followed in
other states. 34 C. J., 1166; 15 R. C. L., 919. In a Missouri case it was held
that "Courts generally through a species of courtesy called comity will recog-
nize the validity of a foreign judgment when it is shown that the court render-
ing it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the persons of the parties
litigant," but "the duty to recognize the validity and effect of a judgment or
proceedings of a court in a foreign jurisdiction rests upon comity, and it is not
regarded as an absolute legal right." Grey v. Independent Order of Foresters,
(1917)! 196 S. W., 779. C. S. N. '27.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-TRANSPORTATION OF.-Defendant is charged under an
Act of Indiana with transporting liquor, the offense consisting of carrying the
liquor from his woodshed to his dwelling house where he hid the liquor, and
where the state's officers found it. Held, that the defendant's acts were insuffi-
cient to constitute transportation and that to "transport" intoxicating liquor is to
carry it over, across, or remove it from one "place" to "another" and does
not include removing or transferring it about in a particular area or tract by
one in possession thereof; "place" being defined as area or portion of land
marked off or separated from the rest as by occupancy, use, or character, and
"another" as meaning a distinct and different place. Hamwell v. State, (Ind.
1926) 152 N. E., 161.
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